Institutions supposed to serve people, not government No one even remotely familiar with the Hungarian political, economic or social situation will disagree with János Kis’s diagnosis (Issue 6, page 6, Hungary at a political dead end) – the country is in a mess and desperately needs solutions. There are two areas, however, where Kis’s analysis needs refinement. One of these is his assessment of the Hungarian right and, by implication, the political party that represents the right, Fidesz (to which I belong). [Kis was co-founder and first chairman of the Alliance of the Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and was a key figure at the time of the political change in 1989-90.] Complex composition The traditionalist group that Kis identifies does exist, but is far from being the sole or even the dominant group in Hungarian conservatism. Hungarian society today is much more complex than he implies and this is reflected in the composition of the centre and right of the political spectrum. A considerable proportion of the right is made up of people who accept modernity, regard themselves as a part of the European mainstream, are law-abiding and dislike the corruption that characterises so much of the activity of the state. Also missing from Kis’s analysis is any reflection on the differences between Budapest and the rest of the country, where four-fifths of the population lives and where the left is rather weak. A further element in Hungarian conservatism is the support of the under 35 age group, many of them with experience of the world outside Hungary and the urban professionals who dislike the party-politicisation of seemingly everything. Hungarian sense of modernity The significance of these reasonably modern-minded conservative social groups is that the traditionalist views that Kis describes, like the nationalism, the Christian-national ideology, the anti-Semitism and anti-modernism have far less purchase than he implies. The Hungarian right does have a view of itself as being Hungarian, but sees no shame in this, let alone its being a source of xenophobia. Survey evidence bears this out. Basically, what Hungarian conservatives would like to see is a Hungarian sense of modernity that strengthens their identity as Hungarians and offers them meaning in their lives. The other factor missing from Kis’s assessment is the state of the political system itself. The left-wing government, in power since 2002, basically inherited a reasonably effective economy and an institutional structure that did provide a fair measure of good governance – good, not perfect. Both the Medgyessy and Gyurcsány governments did much to transform this in a negative direction. The massive overspending of the early years was supposed to be clawed back through inflation, but this strategy – in my view properly – was stymied by the Hungarian National Bank, resulting in the mounting deficits and foreign indebtedness of the last few years. Undermining democratic infrastructure Even more seriously, the left-wing government has relied on a basic design flaw in the Hungarian system, that a prime minister with a parliamentary majority is free to do as he or she likes, without constraints. Both Medgyessy and Gyurcsány have used this to undermine the intermediate institutions that constitute the democratic infrastructure without which political power escapes supervision. The only domestic institution that still plays a role in the necessary checks and balances is the Constitutional Court , which has consequently become vulnerable to charges of politicisation. The use of the instruments of coercion, including the National Security Office, for political purposes, oversteps the boundaries of democracy. Only criticism from Brussels and Washington is taken seriously. The opposition has been marginalised, civil society is ignored, technical advice is overlooked where this conflicts with political goals (e.g. the fourth metro line in Budapest), a constant stream of regulations, often completely contradictory, means that the oversized state apparatus cannot function with even the semblance of rationality. Transparency, accountability, a sense of responsibility and moderation are notable by their absence. The concentration of power in the hands of the government has had a deplorable outcome – the politicisation of areas that should be free of party politics and which have become a part of the spoils system. The ruling elite sees this as a winner-take-all system and it bends the law to suit its own purposes. For all practical purposes, Hungary is ruled by a rent-seeking elite. The danger of populism noted by Kis is real, but he does not join up the dots – the danger is emerging because political power has become intolerably favourable to the left and the rest of society, whose status as citizens is systematically overridden, is subjected to near-total exclusion. Media fails us The media don’t help. Their tone is frequently close to hysterical, their highly charged emotionalism precludes cool assessment and their reliability is, therefore, discounted: hence an atmosphere of distrust and fear. The exaggeration of the significance of the Hungarian Guard – a wholly marginal body if ever there was one – is a case in point. The left-dominated media had a field day, but entirely failed to mention its irrelevance. Again, surveys show clearly that the overwhelming majority of Hungarians has no time for either the extreme right or the extreme left. The present danger Kis’s analysis focuses on the domination of the political scene by the past. There is truth in this, but leaving the past behind will only solve a part of the problem. What is essential is a recognition by those with power – currently the left – that they cannot run Hungary as if it were a one-party system that exists solely for their benefit. There must, therefore, be a realisation by those in power that they share an interest with the right in the continued existence of the Hungarian state, in the well-being of society, in sustaining civic norms, and generally respecting the demands of democracy. My fear is that the left-wing power elite knows all this full well, but has not the slightest intention of heeding the danger that its monopolisation of power is potentially producing – an explosion of anger that would seriously endanger Hungarian democracy. The need for a historic compromise is more urgent than ever. 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